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Abstract
Bizur is a consensus algorithm exposing a key-value in-
terface. It is used by a distributed file-system that scales
to 100s of servers, delivering millions of IOPS, both data
and metadata, with consistent low-latency.
Bizur is aimed for services that require strongly con-
sistent state, but do not require a distributed log; for ex-
ample, a distributed lock manager or a distributed ser-
vice locator. By avoiding a distributed log scheme, Bizur
outperforms distributed log based consensus algorithms,
producing more IOPS and guaranteeing lower latencies
during normal operation and especially during failures.
Paxos-like algorithms (e.g., Zab and Raft) which are
used by existing distributed file-systems, can have artifi-
cial contention points due to their dependence on a dis-
tributed log. The distributed log is needed when repli-
cating a general service, but when the desired service is
key-value based, the contention points created by the dis-
tributed log can be avoided.
Bizur does exactly that, by reaching consensus inde-
pendently on independent keys. This independence al-
lows Bizur to handle failures more efficiently and to scale
much better than other consensus algorithms, allowing
the file-system that utilizes Bizur to scale with it.
1 Introduction
File-systems are a very convenient way to access data.
As systems and data centers become larger, their require-
ments from file-systems scale as well. The crux of scal-
ing a file-system is to scale while providing strong con-
sistency.
File-system operations can be divided into two main
categories: data operations, such as read and write, and
metadata operations, like create file and lookup. Usually,
it is easier to scale the data operations, while scaling the
metadata operations is harder. The main reason being
that preserving metadata consistency is more subtle than
preserving data’s consistency. For example, two writes to
different files cannot affect each other, while two rename
operations on different directories could affect each other
- since they might create a loop in the directory structure.
Many distributed file-systems utilize Paxos as their
configuration service or even as their metadata service.
Examples of such file-systems include Ceph [38, 30],
GFS (Google Filesystem) via its Chubby service [6],
XtreemFS [15, 16], Infinit [2] and Nutanix [35].
In this paper we present Bizur, a new key-value con-
sensus algorithm. Bizur is used as an alternative for
Paxos, both as a configuration service and especially as
the underlying infrastructure for a scalable metadata ser-
vice. Bizur’s main properties are: high-concurrency, lin-
ear scalability and low latency while preserving strict
consistency.
1.1 Motivation
At Elastifile we’ve built a distributed scale-out file-
system, that is designed to scale to 100s and 1000s of
servers. To achieve that, the file-system’s metadata ser-
vices are truly distributed: each file or directory can be
owned by a different server, and can migrate as the work-
load changes. This fine-grained dynamic metadata own-
ership allows to scale linearly both the data and the meta-
data operations.
Since files and directories are dynamically owned,
there is a distributed repository that keeps track of which
server is the owner of which file / dir. This service is
called the ownership repository coordinator, a.k.a. ORC.
The ORC service must provide a (strongly) consistent
view of its state, since the consistency of the entire file-
system depends on the ORC.
Many user-initiated requests, especially metadata re-
quests, could potentially query the ORC service to know
which server is handling the relevant file / dir. Therefore,
the concurrency of operations against the ORC service
could be very high. In addition, our file-system is re-
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quired to provide consistent performance, with the low-
est possible degradation during failure and recovery.
Previous consensus algorithms like Paxos [26], Zab
[17] or Raft [34] don’t handle these requirements well
enough (see Subsection 1.2). Bizur was created to pro-
vide the high-concurrency and the consistent low-latency
that is required by Elastifile’s services. Subsection 1.3
gives an overview on how Bizur achieves that.
Bizur is also used for Elastifile’s Cluster Database
(ECDB); this service provides a persistent, consistent
and fault-tolerant view of the cluster’s state (sometimes
called “configuration service”). The main difference be-
tween the usage of Bizur by the ORC service and by
the ECDB service is that the ORC service is in-memory,
while the ECDB is persisted. This allows the ORC ser-
vice to be blazingly fast, without harming the consis-
tency of the service. Regular failures are handled by
Bizur’s fault tolerance, and total power failure is han-
dled by reconstructing the ORC’s state from information
persisted during transactions1.
Remark 1 The results presented in Section 5 refer to the
persisted version of Bizur (the ECDB service), so that
they can be compared fairly with the other persisted ser-
vices: etcd and ZooKeeper. The latencies of the ORC
service are much faster, as it doesn’t need to write to
disk.
1.2 Distributed Log Drawbacks
Consensus algorithms like Paxos, Zab and Raft are all
based on a distributed log. Operations are written to the
log, and the state of the system is advanced by applying
the log entries one after the other. Therefore, to reach
the state relevant to some log entry n, all the log entries
preceding it must be applied first. This creates two kinds
of dependencies between entires: “false” dependencies
between a log entry and its preceding ones, and “real”
dependencies between a log entry affecting some content
x and preceding entries that affect the same content x.
Real dependencies have the following drawback: to be
able to read some content x, we must first find all the log
entries relating to x, and apply them in order. Thus, if
some server has been disconnected for some time, and
is now reconnected, it must first recover multiple log en-
tries before it can access the content of x. There is no
clear bound on howmany such entries the server must re-
cover. This drawback manifests itself mainly when there
are partial disconnections, and the service continues to
advance while some of the servers are not updated.
False dependencies between log entries have two ad-
ditional different drawbacks. First, a single slow oper-
1Exact specification of the ORC service is outside the scope of this
paper.
ation will increase the latency of all succeeding opera-
tions, until the slow operation is committed. For exam-
ple, a network packet drop will affect multiple ongoing
operations (instead of affecting just the operation within
the dropped packet). Second, during recovery, the dis-
tributed log must be recovered and replayed, which can
take a long time (the time it takes to recover and replay
the log depends on additional choices, like the rate at
which checkpoint is performed). Both of these draw-
backs hamper the ability to deliver consistent latency for
user-initiated IOs.
There is an additional drawback to the high cost of re-
covery: longer timeouts for failure detection. To see why,
consider the following: on the one hand we want short
timeouts to detect real failures quickly. On the other
hand, if the timeouts are too quick we pay the cost of
recovery when we didn’t really need to, since it wasn’t
a real failure (for example, a short network failure, or a
loaded server that didn’t get running time for the con-
sensus process). Thus, there is a trade-off between the
time to overcome a real failure and the number of falsely-
detected failures. When the cost of false detection is
high, systems have longer timeouts to detect real failures,
and thus take longer to return to normal operation.
Moreover, replicating state using a distributed log
means that each replica has some “base state” on top of
which the log is replayed. This base-state must be up-
dated periodically, to avoid maintaining an ever growing
log. Thus, distributed log based algorithms have an ad-
ditional flow of log-compaction (also call checkpointing
or snapshotting). During this process the servers agree
on some new base-state, and can erase the log leading up
to that state. Log compaction is complex with non-trivial
trade-offs [33, 8], and requiring it is another drawback.
To sum up, the drawbacks that consensus algorithms
based on a distributed log have are: a) reading an object
requires having all related preceding entries available, b)
a slow operation will affect unrelated succeeding opera-
tions, c) time to detect a failure is longer, d) once a fail-
ure is detected, recovery can take a long time, and e) it
requires handling the complex flow of log-compaction.
1.3 Our Contribution
Bizur was created to overcome the aforementioned draw-
backs. Bizur is a consensus algorithm that ensures con-
sistent low latency of operations. It allows for inde-
pendent operations to run concurrently without affecting
each other (no false dependencies); and it guarantees a
constant latency addition in case of failures (or leader
change). This allows us to have a very low timeout of
failure detection; in our implementation, the timeout is
100ms.
Bizur achieves these features by avoiding the usage of
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a distributed log. Since there is no log, there is no need
for one operation to wait for an unrelated operation to be
written to the log, and no need to wait for log recovery
upon failure. As a bonus, there is also no need to handle
log compaction, which can be quite arduous (see [33, 8]).
The main difference between Bizur and the other con-
sensus algorithms (e.g., Paxos), is that the distributed
log based consensus algorithms solve a more general
problem. They are a generalized solution, that enables
consensus for any data model. Bizur, on the other
hand, is optimized for a specific use-case: a strongly-
consistent distributed key-value store. Since Bizur is uti-
lized for a specific use-case, it makes stronger assump-
tions about the data model, and can avoid unneeded con-
tention points.
In many cases (i.e., etcd [1] or ZooKeeper [14]) key-
value stores are build on top of a distributed log based
consensus algorithms (Raft in the case of etcd, and Zab in
the case of ZooKeeper). Those systems pay for the price
of a generalized data model, while they in fact support a
much simpler one. Bizur merges the lower-level consen-
sus algorithmwith the higher-level key-value data model.
The resulting key-value consensus has concurrency and
low-latency properties that don’t exist in systems that are
based on the more generalized consensus.
Bizur exploits the simplified key-value data model, by
allowing operations on different keys to advance inde-
pendently. It can be thought of as if each key has its
own distributed log consensus algorithm. However, that
would be very inefficient. Moreover, once each key is
updated independently, we don’t really need a log any-
more. Instead, Bizur uses shared-memory like constructs
(see [4]) to reach consensus on the value of each key.
Thus avoiding the need for a state’s history of each key-
value pair, and hence not needing a distributed log at all.
The straightforward mapping of keys to multiple
“small” consensuses (e.g., a consensus instance per key)
has its difficulties (see Subsection 2.2). Bizur introduces
a more subtle mapping, by hashing the keys into prede-
fined buckets, on which consensus is achieved.
An additional gain of Bizur’s key-value data model is
that scaling and sharding can be done at the Bizur level,
and not at the application level. When working with dis-
tributed log based consensus algorithm sharding is an ap-
plication task; the application needs to decide according
to what it performs the sharding. When scaling, the ap-
plication will need to handle creating new instances of
the consensus algorithm to handle the different shards.
This means that each application needs to “reinvent the
wheel” regarding scaling and sharding. Due to Bizur’s
simplified data model, sharding is trivial, and is done by
hashing the key. Thus, scaling and shard management
are implemented once in the Bizur algorithm, and can be
reused multiple times by various applications.
2 The Bizur Algorithm
The Bizur algorithm is designed to run in real-world en-
vironments. More formally, it assumes asynchronous
message passing and supports message drops as well as
crash-stop failures. It does not handle Byzantine failures.
The Bizur algorithm exposes a key-value interface,
containing the get, set, delete and iterate keys operations.
Each key is mapped into a bucket, and the bucket is repli-
cated across the cluster. The buckets are independent of
each other, allowing for high-concurrency of operations.
Operations on keys that map into the same bucket are
serialized. The number of buckets depends on the num-
ber of keys supported by the system, and on the desired
density of keys-to-buckets.
Bizur achieves consensus on each bucket in a similar
way to an atomic register [4]. To ensure atomicity, Bizur
has a single leader per bucket. For simplicity, we use the
same leader for all buckets. We continue the discussion
assuming a single leader; it is easy to extend Bizur to
have different leaders for different buckets.
A Bizur’s run is split into phases called elections. For
each election there is at most one leader. There can be
elections with no leader. The leader is responsible for
receiving requests, processing them and replicating the
affected bucket.
Remark 2 The algorithmic description assumes the fol-
lowing (the exact details are removed for brevity):
• When the leader sends a message to the cluster and
awaits a majority of responses, it is assumed there is
some identifier that associates the responses to the
original message.
• When the leader sends to “all”, it also sends to itself
(as a replica), and this message is assumed to be
received.
• Timeouts are handled as if the leader received a
NACK message from the relevant server.
• Operations on the same bucket are serialized (e.g.,
protected by a mutex).
2.1 Leader Election
Bizur requires at most one leader in each election. To
achieve that, each server p keeps track of two variables:
elect id which is the highest election that p tried to get
elected in, and voted elect id which is the highest elec-
tion that p voted in.
A new election is initiated at server p by calling
STARTELECTION, which increments elect id, and re-
quests the cluster for votes. If enough servers replied
with ACKVOTE, then p marks itself as leader.
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Algorithm 1 Leader Election
1: procedure STARTELECTION
2: elect id← elect id+1
3: send PLEASEVOTE(elect id, self ) to all
4: if received ACKVOTE from majority then
5: is leader← true
6: procedure PLEASEVOTE(elect id, source)
7: if elect id > voted elect id then
8: voted elect id← elect id
9: leader← source
10: reply ACKVOTE to source
11: else if elect id = voted elect id and
12: source = leader then
13: reply ACKVOTE to source
14: else reply NACKVOTE to source
A request for a vote is done by sending PLEASEVOTE.
When server q receives PLEASEVOTE from p, it checks
if it is a new election and if so q records its vote for p;
otherwise, q returns NACKVOTE to p.
Algorithm 1 contains the pseudo code for the leader
election flow.
Claim 1 For every elect id there is at most one server
that marks is leader as true (Line 5).
Proof 1 Sketch: For every elect id, every server q votes
for at most one server p. A server can execute Line 5 only
if it received ACKVOTE from a majority of the servers.
If two servers p, p′ receive ACKVOTE from a majority of
the servers, then there is a server q that sent ACKVOTE
to p and p′. Since q votes for at most one server p (for
the given elect id), we conclude that p= p′.
Claim 1 shows that Algorithm 1 is safe. Its liveness
depends on the actual failure pattern; from our experi-
ence, it works well in practice.
2.2 Replication
Bizur’s replication is based on the concept of a SWMR
register (see [4] for more details). Our implementation
processes all reads at the leader server, slightly simplify-
ing the flow (since usually there is a single reader, instead
of multiple readers).
Replication is done per bucket (and not per key-value
pair), to handle deleted entries. If replication is done
on a key-value pair basis, it would mean that a new key
would require a new instance of the SWMR register, and
deleting a key would require relinquishing the SWMR
instance. Suppose there are multiple concurrent sets and
deletes on the same key: how can we distinguish between
the old and new instances of the SWMR register?
Bizur solves this problem by defining a priori a fixed
number of long-lived buckets, each of which has a
Algorithm 2 Bucket Replication: Write
1: procedureWRITE(bucket) ⊲ By leader
2: bucket.ver.elect id← elect id
3: bucket.ver.counter← bucket.ver.counter+1
4: send REPLICAWRITE(bucket, self ) to all
5: if received ACKWRITE from majority then
6: return true
7: else
8: is leader← false
9: return false
10: procedure REPLICAWRITE(bucket, source)
11: if bucket.ver.elect id < voted elect id then
12: reply NACKWRITE to source
13: else
14: voted elect id← bucket.ver.elect id
15: leader← source ⊲ “update” vote
16: local buckets[bucket.index]← bucket
17: reply ACKWRITE to source
SWMR instance. Each key-value pair is hashed into a
bucket, and the updated bucket is then replicated. Since
there are no creations and/or deletions of SWMR in-
stances, the aforementioned problem doesn’t exist.
Algorithm 2 describes the write flow of buckets, and
Algorithm 3 describes the read flow of buckets. Follow-
ing is a quick overview of these algorithms. The WRITE
and READ operations are internal to the Bizur servers,
and are not exposed to the Bizur client.
Buckets are identified by their index (recall there is
a fixed number of buckets). Each bucket has a version
ver, which is a tuple composed of: a) elect id which is
the leader’s elect id when the bucket was written, and
b) counter, which increases by one each time the bucket
is written. When there is a new elect id the counter is
zeroed.
When writing a bucket (see WRITE) the leader sets the
bucket’s version and sends the bucket to all the servers in
the Bizur cluster. If the leader receives enough acks, it
considers the write successful; otherwise, it relinquishes
its leadership, since it does not have a majority of servers
that think its the leader.
Each replica, when receiving a write request,
compares the bucket’s ver.elect id to the replica’s
voted elect id. If the bucket is more up-to-date the
replica updates its “voting history” and updates its local
view of the bucket. Since Bizur assumes non-Byzantine
failures, the leader was indeed voted in by a majority of
servers, thus updating a server’s vote to the majority’s
vote won’t affect the safety of the leader election. If the
bucket’s version is older than the replica’s latest vote, the
replica rejects the write; notifying the originator leader
that it is no longer the leader.
Reading a bucket is slightly more involved, since it
also recovers the bucket following a leader change. First
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Algorithm 3 Bucket Replication: Read
1: procedure READ(index) ⊲ By leader
2: if not ENSURERECOVERY(index, elect id) then
3: return ⊥
4: send REPLICAREAD(index, elect id, self ) to all
5: if received ACKREAD from majority then
6: return local buckets[index]
7: else
8: is leader← false
9: return ⊥
10: procedure REPLICAREAD(index, elect id, source)
11: if elect id < voted elect id then
12: reply NACKREAD to source
13: else
14: voted elect id← elect id
15: leader← source ⊲ “update” vote
16: reply ACKREAD(local buckets[index]) to source
Algorithm 4 Bucket Replication: Recovery
1: procedure ENSURERECOVERY(index, elect id)
2: if elect id = local buckets[index].ver.elect id then
3: return true
4: send REPLICAREAD(index, elect id, self ) to all
5: if received ACKREAD from majority then
6: max ver←max{bucket.ver | received bucket}
7: bucket ← some bucket s.t. bucket.ver = max ver
8: bucket.ver.elect id ← elect id
9: bucket.ver.counter← 0
10: return WRITE(bucket)
11: else
12: is leader← false
13: return false
thing READ does is to ensure that the bucket was recov-
ered (see Subsection 2.3). If the bucket was recovered, it
means the leader has successfully written its view of the
bucket previously. Thus, the leader can return the content
of its local bucket (Line 6). All that is left is to ensure that
the leader is indeed the leader, which is accomplished by
sending REPLICAREAD to all replicas (Line 4) and re-
quiring to receive a majority of acks (Line 5).
Each replica, when receiving a read request, does the
same “voting history update” as it does in the write case.
If the replica hasn’t voted in a newer election, it will re-
spond with the bucket from its local view.
2.3 Recovery
Recovery occurs when the leader is replaced, either due
to a failure, or because it was disconnected for a long
time. If a server that is not the leader fails (or is discon-
nected) no recovery occurs. Recovery is on a per-bucket
basis, and can thus occur concurrently and independently
on multiple buckets. Due to this property, Bizur per-
forms the recovery lazily on the first request (following
the leader change) to a bucket.
ENSURERECOVERY (see Algorithm 4) guarantees
that a READ that follows a leader change will first re-
cover the bucket. Line 2 checks if the bucket has already
been recovered, and if so returns immediately, shortcut-
ting the somewhat expensive distributed operation that
follows. Notice that the local bucket’s elect id is up-
dated only during WRITE, and thus comparing it to the
current elect id (Line 2) does indeed tell us if the bucket
is already recovered or not.
If the current elect id is newer, then there was a leader
change, and recovery is performed (Line 4-Line 10). Re-
covery consists of reading the bucket from a majority of
replicas, selecting the bucket with the highest version
(Line 6-Line 7) and writing it back to the replicas with
an updated version (Line 8-Line 10).
Notice that following a leader change, the first read
of the bucket will update the bucket’s version elect id.
This ensures that the leader’s bucket’s version is the high-
est among all versions at the replicas (for that specific
bucket), since bucket’s versions are compared by first
comparing the elect id part, and since the leader has a
higher elect id from all previous leaders. This flow is
crucial for the correctness of Bizur, as it ensures a value
read by the leader won’t change without an additional
write by the leader. Without this flow, there can be “hid-
den” writes that later are seen by the leader, causing the
value of the bucket to change without a write from the
leader.
2.4 Key-Value
The Bizur clients expose key-value API: GET, SET,
DELETE and ITERATEKEYS. When a Bizur client re-
ceives a request, it forwards it to the leader. Algorithm 5
described the flow of the operations at the leader.
As described in Section 2.2, Bizur’s internal replica-
tion uses buckets. Algorithm 5 shows how the mapping
between key-value to buckets occurs.
We assume a bucket encodes key-value pairs in some
format. The following helper functions are used to
access this encoding: hash(key) returns the bucket’s
index which the key hashes into, decode(bucket,key)
returns the value referred by key within the bucket,
encode set(bucket,key,value) adds the (key,value) pair
to the bucket, encode delete(bucket,key) removes
the key (and referred value) from the bucket, and
decode keys(bucket) returns the set of keys encoded in
the bucket.
Notice that each of the key-value operations performs
an internal READ operation. As seen in Section 2.2, the
READ operation performs “recovery” for the first read
occurring after a leader change. Following operations
5
Algorithm 5 Key-Value API
1: procedure GET(key)
2: index← hash(key)
3: bucket ← READ(index)
4: return decode(bucket,key)
5: procedure SET(key, value)
6: index← hash(key)
7: bucket ← READ(index)
8: encode set(bucket,key,value)
9: WRITE(bucket)
10: procedure DELETE(key)
11: index← hash(key)
12: bucket ← READ(index)
13: encode delete(bucket,key)
14: WRITE(bucket)
15: procedure ITERATEKEYS
16: res← /0
17: for all index do
18: bucket ← READ(index)
19: res= res∪decode keys(bucket)
20: return res
will usually avoid the additional cost incurred by the re-
covery (the additional write phase).
Our implementation supports conditional SET and
DELETE. That is, the mutating operations can receive
an expected value, and perform the set / delete only if the
expected value is indeed the one existing in the bucket.
Since all operations go through the leader it is straight-
forward to add this variant. For brevity, the details are
removed from Algorithm 5.
2.5 Correctness
Following is a sketch of the correctness proof of the
Bizur algorithm. Subsection 2.1 treats the leader elec-
tion flow, and ensures that there is at most one leader
for every election. Since each bucket is independent of
the others, we can concentrate our analysis on a single
bucket.
Due to the leader election properties, and due to
REPLICAWRITE and REPLICAREAD, at most one leader
is able to work with a majority of the servers. Thus, we
can talk about “the leader” of bucket.
All operations go through the leader of bucket, so as
long as there is no new election, the leader can serial-
ize the operations, ensuring linearizability of the bucket.
The first operation a new leader performs “fixes” the con-
tent of bucket, ensuring all future operations of the same
leader are valid. Recall that the leader performs one op-
eration at a time for bucket (Remark 2). We’re left with
ensuring that a leader’s change and the first operation of
a the new leader maintains linearizability.
Consider the first operation a new leader does:
Algorithm 6 Reconfiguration Read
1: procedure RECONFIGREAD(index) ⊲ By leader
2: bucket ← READ(index) ⊲ from new
3: if bucket.needs copy then
4: bucket ← READ(index) from old Bizur instance
5: bucket.needs copy← f alse
6: WRITE(bucket) ⊲ to new
7: return bucket
WRITE: The leader will overwrite the previous content
of bucket, thus ignoring the previous content. Notice that
the bucket.ver contains the new elect id and is higher
than any previous bucket version bukcet had. This is cru-
cial for the READ operation.
READ: The leader will first recover the previous con-
tent of bucket (Line 4-Line 10 in Algorithm 4). As part
of this recovery, the leader reads the most up to date pre-
vious value, updates the bucket version and writes bucket
back to the cluster. Ensuring two properties: a) the con-
tent returned by READ is written to a majority of the
servers, so future reads will see it, and b) the content
returned is a content written by some previous leader,
ensuring consistency.
Remark 3 Notice that until the new leader’s first oper-
ation, the value of bucket is potentially “undetermined”,
since the old leader might be in the middle of aWRITE. If
the new leader starts with a READ, the content that it will
see depends on what replicas received the old leader’s
messages. Once the new leader recovers the bucket, the
value is determined, and the old leader can’t affect its
content anymore.
To sum up, following a leader’s election, the first oper-
ation it performs on a given bucket will “fix” the content
of that bucket. All future operations of the same leader
are serialized. Therefore, all operations on the bucket
preserve linearizability, as required.
2.6 Reconfiguration
Bizur’s support for reconfiguration (change in the clus-
ter’s members) was inspired by [29]. The main idea is
to have two Bizur instances running old and new and to
transfer responsibility between them in a consistent and
fault-tolerant fashion.
Consider a Bizur cluster old containing a set of servers
O, and consider a reconfiguration step that would like to
update the Bizur cluster to be the set of servers N. The
following supportsO andN being any set of servers, they
can be disjoint, intersect or even be the same set (i.e.,
O= N).
First step is to create a new Bizur instance new run-
ning on the cluster N. The servers in O∩N will partici-
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pate in both old and new instances. The new instance is
in a reconfig state, which means any request it receives
will first copy the bucket from the old instance, then
handled by the new instance. The second step notifies
the old instance to return a RECONFIGERROR to all re-
quests (including ongoing ones). When a client receives
RECONFIGERROR it will resend the message to the new
instance. At this stage, we’re guaranteed that no client
requests will be processed by the old instance.
The third step is to notify all clients that they should
access the new instance. This step isn’t always needed,
because clients that will contact the old instance will get
an error telling them to contact the new instance. How-
ever, eventually the old instance will be removed, and by
then all clients should be aware of the new instance.
The last two steps are cleanup steps: first we wait un-
til the new instance finishes copying all data from the
old instance (this can happen slowly in the background),
after which its state changes from reconfig to normal.
Lastly, the old instance can be removed.
During the reconfiguration, there are two Bizur in-
stances that are alive, each with its own fault-tolerance.
Therefore, both instances continue operating correctly,
even in the presence of failures, making the reconfigura-
tion process fault-tolerant as well.
When the new instance is in the reconfig state, it keeps
track of additional information per bucket, stating if the
bucket has already been copied or not. When the new
instance was created all buckets were set to require copy
from old. When a first access to a bucket occurs, the
new instance reads the bucket, sees that it requires copy
from the old instance, copies is, and writes it to the new
instance, marking that it doesn’t require copying. Note
that the reconfig state ends only after all buckets have
been copied.
Algorithm 6 describes the RECONFIGREAD method,
which is used instead of the regular READ method when
in reconfig state.
2.7 Optimizations
When implementing the Bizur algorithm, we’ve em-
ployed multiple optimizations to improve the perfor-
mance and reduce the overhead. This section describes
some of the optimizations.
The most straight-forward optimization is to avoid
checking the leader is still the leader (Line 4-Line 5 in
Algorithm 3) if ENSURERECOVERY indeed performed
recovery. The recovery flow itself validates that the
leader still has a majority following it, and thus there is
no need for an additional check.
A related optimization avoids sending the content of
the bucket (from replicas to the leader) when recovery
is not needed. That is, when READ needs to validate
the leader still has a majority, there is no need to send
the content of the buckets to the leader (since the leader
has the content locally); it is enough to send ACKREAD
without data.
The SET and DELETE methods (see Algorithm 5)
first call READ, then call WRITE. In normal operation
(when recovery is not needed), the READ path performs
a cluster-wide validation that the leader has majority.
However, the WRITE will also perform this cluster-wide
validation, as part of sending the data to the replicas. To
improve upon this, if the bucket is already recovered, the
leader skips the READ altogether, and uses its local copy
of the bucket instead. Recall that READ’s goal (when the
bucket is already recovered) is to guarantee the leader is
still the leader. However, since replicas won’t accept the
write if they have voted for a newer elect id, we get that
guarantee during the write as well. This optimization al-
lows us to do just one cluster-wide message round-trip
for SET and DELETE, in the common case of a bucket
that has been recovered.
Regarding performing recovery on a bucket, we men-
tioned previously that it can be done lazily on the first
access to the bucket. However, the recovery process in-
curs additional latency, albeit minimal, and we want to
eliminate it when possible. To that end, when a leader
gets elected, it will start a background process that will
slowly go over the entire data set, and recover all bucket.
Thus ensuring that eventually all buckets (even empty
ones) have been recovered, and all future IOs will not
require recovery.
An optimization we haven’t implemented, aims to re-
duce the load and time it takes for this background pro-
cess to run. The straightforward implementation recov-
ers every bucket, as a separate operation. In some cases,
for example when there is almost no data, it is possible
to batch the recovery of multiple buckets into a single
message round-trip.
A similar optimization, which we have implemented,
applies to ITERATEKEYS. Since ITERATEKEYS needs
to go over all the buckets and extract the keys, it is very
efficient to batch it. Moreover, since ITERATEKEYS just
reads the buckets, we can do this batching at the leader.
More precisely, we need to check the leader is still the
leader of the bucket range we’re batching, then we can
process that entire range locally at the leader, without
communicating with the other servers. This provides are
very efficient implementation of ITERATEKEYS, both
latency-wise and w.r.t. the load it creates on the cluster.
3 Scalability
Bizur scales linearly, so long as the workload distributes
more or less evenly across the key space. Bizur’s API
lends itself nicely to sharding, since each range of buck-
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ets can be stored on a single shard. Since the require-
ments around leadership are bucket-oriented (i.e., each
bucket needs a single leader, but different buckets can
have different leaders), each shard can have its own
leader; so long that a given bucket is handled by a sin-
gle shard.
Bizur can scale dynamically, by expanding and con-
tracting. The scaling is shard based: when the system
first starts, all shards are on the same servers. As servers
are added, shards are migrated to those new servers. The
shard migration occurs using the same reconfiguration
described in Section 2.6. To shrink the system back, the
shards are migrated back, and the servers that don’t have
any shards on them can be removed.
Using a static number of shards (256 in our case) sim-
plifies the code, yet allows it to grow to very large clus-
ters. It is possible to implement expanding/contracting
by splitting and merging shards to achieve a dynamic
number of shards. We found the simplified version (static
number of shards) to be sufficient.
The GET, SET and DELETE operations operate on a
single key, and thus on a single bucket. Hence, the
more servers we have, the more operations we can do
concurrently, keeping the same latency. On the other
hand, the ITERATEKEYS operation requires to go over
the entire key set. The more servers we have, the more
work each ITERATEKEYS needs to do. However, since
the shards are independent, the execution of a single
ITERATEKEYS operation can occur concurrently on all
shards, thus spreading the required work across the en-
tire cluster.
The ability to scale linearly is due to the less general
API of Bizur. This allows us to avoid reimplementing
scaling flows over and over again, in each application
that uses Bizur.
4 Testing
To test the strong consistency (strict serializability) of
the Bizur implementation, we’ve developed a testing tool
called Serialla2.
Serialla is a randomized testing tool, that executes con-
current operations against the Bizur, while tracking the
responses. It then looks for a strict serializable execution
that can explain the operations and responses. If it finds
such an execution, it continues testing with another batch
of concurrent operations. If no such execution exists, Se-
rialla will report the problem, together with a descriptive
log of the concurrent operations; passing the responsibil-
ity on to a human developer to find and fix the bug.
2Serialla is a generic tool, used to test strict serializability of addi-
tional services in Elastifile’s file-system, not just Bizur.
Serialla tries to create as much chaos as possible: de-
velopers can annotate areas of the code which are sensi-
tive to races. Serialla will then (randomly) try to explore
these races, by scheduling in / out the relevant threads.
For example, when taking a lock, usually the lock will
not be contended, and regular tests will not explore the
races around it. By using the annotation, Serialla will ex-
plore different possible schedules (i.e., races) around the
lock, even when it is not contented, thus flushing out rare
bugs.
5 Experimental Evaluation
The cluster consists of 4 Supermicro servers, equipped
with an Intel Xeon E5-2620 processor running at
2.40GHz. Each server has a 10-Gigabit Intel 82599EB
NIC, and a 128GB SanDisk SATA SSD device. All
servers run Linux CentOS 7.1 within a VM (NICs are
configured with SR-IOV and SSDs are configured with
passthrough).
Our tests utilize a single core on each machine, where
3 servers run the consensus algorithm, and one server
creates the load. All tests were done with 100% writes
(set operation) of small values, 50 bytes each. We
avoided reads (get operations) since the current version
of etcd performs reads directly from the leader, without
contacting the cluster, which doesn’t preserve the same
consistency level as Bizur and ZooKeeper do.
Three different key-value systems are evaluated: etcd
v3.1.0-rc.1 (which uses the Raft consensus algorithm),
ZooKeeper 3.4.9 (which uses the Zab consensus algo-
rithm) and Bizur3. etcd and ZooKeeper were evaluated
with their default configuration parameters.
Section 3 describes the ability of Bizur to scale by
utilizing multiple shards. Since etcd and ZooKeeper do
not support this, the following benchmarks contain a sin-
gle shard only. Notice that Bizur can reach much higher
throughput, while preserving the same low-latency, if it
is allowed to use multiple shards.
The different systems are written in different lan-
guages: Bizur is written in C, etcd is written in Go and
ZooKeeper is written in Java. The difference in program-
ming language could affect the performance of the sys-
tem, but isn’t expected to affect the behavior of a system.
That is, etcd’s lower throughput can be explained by Go
being slower than C; but etcd’s throughput drop during
leader failure is hard to attribute to the Go language, and
is most likely related to the Raft protocol itself.
First, we evaluate the effect on performance, of the
concurrency and of the number of keys in the data set
(see Subsection 5.1). Second, we evaluate the effect of
3We benchmark the persistent flavor of Bizur, to compare apples to
apples (see Subsection 1.1).
8
packet drops on the performance of the different systems
(see Subsection 5.2). Lastly, we show the behavior of
the different systems when the leader fails (see Subsec-
tion 5.3).
5.1 Concurrency and Key-set Size
Bizur’s high concurrency stems from the independence
of operations. Thus, to fully utilize Bizur, there must
be enough keys so that concurrent operations work on
different keys. Figure 1 shows the throughput, average
latency and 99th percentile latency for different number
of keys. The concurrency (queue depth) of operations is
fixed to 64 throughout this benchmark.
For the Bizur system, once the key-set size reaches the
concurrency (queue depth = 64), the average latency’s
improvement - as well as the throughput’s improvement
- flattens out. This is expected, since once each concur-
rent operation has a different key, Bizur is at it’s optimal
performance. The 99th percentile latency’s improvement
requires more keys to flatten out; this is also expected,
since this percentile measures boundary latencies, which
happen when concurrency operations share the same key.
When the key-set size is close to the queue depth, it is
still likely that there will be concurrent operations shar-
ing the same key.
Both ZooKeeper and etcd have a flat line w.r.t.
throughput and average latency. This is expected, as both
algorithms serialize all operations, so the number of keys
shouldn’t affect the performance. However, both algo-
rithms have a somewhat odd behavior of the 99th per-
centile with larger number of keys: the 99th percentile
latencies decrease as the key-set size increases. We do
not have a good explanation for this behavior.
Figure 2 compares the performance as the concurrency
increases. All three systems present the same (expected)
behavior: the latency increases as the queue depth in-
creases, while the throughput’s improvement flattens out
at some point. Notice the Bizur’s 99th percentile la-
tency increases noticeably slower than that of etcd and
ZooKeeper, and are much closer to the average, mean-
ing that the Bizur’s latency variance is much tighter than
etcd’s or ZooKeeper’s.
We’ve chosen queue depth of 64 as a good trade-off
between throughput gain and latency cost. All following
benchmarks are done with queue depth of 64.
5.2 Packet Drops
In this benchmark we compare the behavior of the sys-
tems under packet drop, ranging from 0% drop and up to
5% packet drop. Packet drops are expected to have lit-
tle effect on Bizur, due to independence of operations.
Thus, if one operations slows down due to a network
issue, other operations just continue running. This ex-
pected behavior can be seen in Figure 3, where the aver-
age latency is increased slightly, and the throughput de-
creases by about 25%.
ZooKeeper and etcd, on the other hand, have a much
more noticeable performance drop. ZooKeepers’ aver-
age latency goes up from 2.1 milliseconds to 28 mil-
liseconds, more than x10. etcd’s average latency goes
up from 4.9 milliseconds to 34, a x7 increase. Through-
put of ZooKeeper degrades from 31K to 2K, a factor of
x15, while etcd degrades from 11K to 2K, a factor of x5.
Figure 3.c displays the 99th percentile. Both
ZooKeeper and etcd have an odd behavior: there are two
sharp jumps in latency around 1% packet drop, then a
again around 3-4%, eventually reaching more than 400
millisecond latency. It is not clear what causes this be-
havior, we postulate it might be an artifact of the TCP
implementation in the kernel.
Bizur’s 99th percentile latency behaves much better:
increasing steadily up to about 45 milliseconds for 5%
packet drop. Bizur uses UDP for its networking, which
is aligned with the previous assumption about the TCP
implementation.
The packet drop test shows the advantage Bizur has
over distributed log based consensus algorithms, like
Raft and Zab. The false and real dependencies incurred
by the distributed log are clearly evident in the behavior
during packet drop. Bizur, on the other hand, behaves
very well as the packet drop increases.
5.3 Leader Failure
In this benchmark we compare the behavior of the sys-
tems when the leader fails. We measure 5 seconds of
performance prior to killing the leader, and another 20
seconds following the leader’s failure.
As can be seen in Figure 4, Bizur has a short drop
in throughput, then goes back to normal operation.
ZooKeeper takes about 7 seconds to go back to normal
operation, with large drops in throughput and huge la-
tencies following the failure. ZooKeeper doesn’t provide
any IOs for the first second after the failure.
etcd’s throughput goes down by about 60%, and takes
7 seconds to go back up to its pre-failure values. etcd has
a peak in latencies immediately following the failure, af-
ter which the latencies go down to levels lower than be-
fore the failure. As the throughput returns to normal, so
do the latencies. Interesting to notice that the lower la-
tencies etcd achieves are the normal latencies ZooKeeper
and Bizur have.
This test emphasizes the benefit of the Bizur algo-
rithm: due to its built-in concurrency design, it has low
cost of leader-change, and can thus support very short
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Figure 1: Effect of number of keys (queue depth = 64)
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Figure 2: Effect of queue depth (number of keys = 16,000)
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Figure 4: Effect of Leader Failure
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failure detection timeouts. That’s why it can return to
normal operations so quickly.
6 Related Work
Consensus algorithms have attracted a lot of attention
in areas requiring high-availability and fault tolerance.
Mainly because they provide the ability to replicate a ser-
vice across multiple servers, in a way that allows the ser-
vice to continue working when some of the servers fail.
This scheme of using consensus to achieve a replicated
service is called “state machine replication” (SMR) [36].
Multiple algorithms fall in the SMR category: the
original Paxos [23], ZooKeeper’s [14] consensus algo-
rithm Zab [17], Raft [34] which aims to simplify Paxos,
and Viewstamp replication [27].
Among the above, Paxos got the most attention, and is
used in large-scale production environments [6, 8, 9] as
well as by many distributed file-systems [35, 30, 16, 2].
Many research papers have improved upon the orig-
inal Paxos. For example, Fast paxos [25] which adds
“fast rounds” that reduces the number of message delays
required to learn a value, or Mencius [31] which round-
robins the proposing server, to evenly spread the leader-
ship load. Such improvements still suffer from both the
false and the real dependencies (see Subsection 1.2).
Others have improved Paxos to be more concurrent,
by removing the false dependencies between log entries.
For example, Generalized Paxos [24] allows concurrent
log entries as long as they commute. Multicoordinated
Paxos [7] and Egalitarian Paxos [32] achieve similar im-
provements.
The above still suffer from real dependencies between
log entries, and as such have the drawbacks mentions in
Subsection 1.2. Algorithms that rely on distributed log
in some form or another will not be able to get rid of real
dependencies, as they’re essential to the manner in which
the state is replicated.
Others have taken atomic memory as their building
block. Examples include RAMBO [13] and a simi-
lar work [3] showing reconfiguration without consensus.
Both support read and write operations, but do not sup-
port conditional write, which is an important primitive
for distributed services. In addition, they concentrate on
individual objects and do not handle having multiple ob-
jects and addressing them.
DO-RAMBO [11] handles multiple objects. However,
it still doesn’t support conditional write, and it assumes a
fixed namespace of the multiple objects it handles. Thus,
a general key-value cannot be used directly, since each
key must be known as part of the fixed namespace.
Another system providing consistent key-value like
behavior appears in [37], which doesn’t support condi-
tional write but it seems that it can be added easily. How-
ever, [37] assumes FIFO links, which incur false depen-
dencies between operations. It might be possible to re-
move this assumption, but it would probably make the
failure handling much more complex.
Another area, which is sometimes mixed with the
above consensus-related field, is that of object-store sys-
tems like Cassandra [22] or MongoDB [5]. These sys-
tems were designed to provide availability over consis-
tency w.r.t. the CAP theorem [12]. As such they orig-
inally were not strongly consistent. There are conflict-
ing claims regarding their consistency today. Specifi-
cally, claims of strong consistency have been refuted (see
[19, 21]).4
Lastly, high-throughput systems like [18, 10] assume
an external configuration service (i.e., Paxos), while sys-
tems like [39, 28] add additional assumptions to the con-
sistency model.
7 Conclusion
State machine replication (SMR) and Paxos-like consen-
sus algorithms are used in many distributed systems in
general, and in scale-out file-systems in particular. The
general data-model supported by such algorithms im-
poses performance constraints: limited scalability and
concurrency, as well as latency issues during failures or
packet drops.
However, when looking closely at the requirements
of distributed systems, and especially at distributed file-
systems, it is possible to weaken the data model to a key-
value data model. Bizur is a consensus algorithm that
exposes a key-value API, and overcomes the scalabil-
ity limits of Paxos-like algorithms, as well as guarantees
low-latency even during failures.
In some systems, SMR is used as an underlying in-
frastructure of a key-value interface (e.g., etcd). In such
places, replacing the key-value layer - that rides on top
of a distributed log consensus algorithm - with Bizur
doesn’t even weaken the data model. It just gains per-
formance.
Through comparative benchmarking with ZooKeeper
and etcd, we’ve shown that Bizur outperforms them in
throughput, average latency and 99th percentile latency;
both in regular operation, during network packet drops
and especially during server failure.
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